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iAbstract
Smartphones have become powerful enough to replace general purpose computers as
the platform for payment applications. This thesis investigates Android smartphone
payment applications and audio-jack magnetic card readers (AMSRs). Taint tracking is
integrated into the payment application analysis to discover where card data may leak
to other applications. The analysis of AMSRs discovers a software logic vulnerability
which provides direction to pursue an investigation of public key cryptography under
the constraints of Android audio port power. Verified by both hand measurements and
simulation, the Samsung Galaxy S2 is found to generate enough power from its audio-
jack to a microcontroller that can perform the ECIES microbenchmark in 1.6s.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The payment industry is evolving alongside the mobile phone industry, and both are try-
ing to attract as many customers as possible. These payment companies are breaking
out into to the mobile market to provide current merchants, or anyone with a smart-
phone and the need for processing magnetic payment cards, with the convenience to
take payment for goods anywhere. However, in order to provide payment applications
that are reputable, they need to guarantee safe transactions, and therefore security and
safety of information must be a top concern. If a merchant’s phone runs a payment
application that processes sensitive information, it is important that other applications
running on the smartphone are not able to access this information. Recent vulnerabili-
ties discovered in Google Wallet demonstrate that it is difficult to secure credit-card data
on a smartphone [1]. This thesis includes a study of a sample of Android point-of-sale
(POS) applications as well as the audio-jack magnetic strip readers (AMSR) available
for the applications. In addition, an evaluation of encryption algorithms is performed
to determine if the security of AMSRs can be improved with current available software.
21.1 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are many fold. This thesis provides an analysis of An-
droid smartphone applications and their AMSR counter parts. This is the first thesis that
reconfigures TaintDroid to track application-specific information and not the standard
built-in Android framework data. This thesis also evaluates elliptic curve cryptography,
and it is shown to be a plausible next step for AMSR designers who want to protect
customer data.
1.2 Overview of content in thesis
This thesis focuses on the mobile POS system available for Android smartphones in-
cluding the payment applications and card readers. The remainder of the thesis is laid
out as follows: In Chapter 2, the payment applications are analyzed to determine if a
malicious application installed on a smartphone could intercept customer information.
In Chapter 3, an analysis of the audio card readers (AMSRs) that encrypt card data
is performed. In Chapter 4, the audio-jack power of Android smartphones is measured
and potential microcontrollers that could be used in a future AMSR design are selected.
In Chapter 5, a firmware model is presented and analyzed to obtain a general energy
consumption model. In Chapter 6, a benchmark of several encryption algorithms for
AMSRs is performed. Lastly, in Chapter 7, a conclusion is provided to summarize the
findings and provide the direction mobile POS systems may go in the future.
3Chapter 2
Application Analysis
A variety of credit card payment applications available from Google Play were down-
loaded and analyzed to understand how these applications and the Android framework
protect card data. Since no source code is available, the applications were disassem-
bled into dalvik bytecode instructions assisted by the Android reverse-engineering tool
apktool [2]. To understand the behavior of each application, static analysis, coupled
with dynamic analysis, was used to provide insight on how card data is being protected,
and possibly how it could be improved. I now begin with a discussion on the Android
security model.
2.1 Android security model
Android applications run within Google’s Dalvik VM and all are given a unique applica-
tion process or UIDs. Application process permissions are Linux-based, where security is
enforced by the operating system. Applications can execute native code and run outside
the Dalvik VM by using Android’s native interface, but the native code still runs under
same the application’s process UID. Applications are provided with a private directory
where the phone is able to store files only accessible to that application.
Permissions to services provided by the Android framework are configured when the
4application is installed. At install time, the user is presented with a list of permissions
that the application has requested access to. It is up to the user to grant (install) or
deny (not install) the application.
2.1.1 Manifest file
The AndroidManifest.xml file is included with every application and contains informa-
tion about the permissions the application requires, it also contains information re-
garding whether or not the application is debuggable, the components of the Android
framework it uses or provides, and other metadata about the application. A miscon-
figured manifest file can cause unintended security vulnerabilities and leak sensitive
information [3]. This was not the case with the payment applications.
2.1.2 Interprocessor communication
Android applications communicate through a set of components to provide asynchronous
communication and control the user interface. These items are discussed below.
Intents The Intent component provides a description of an action to be performed.
Intents can also store additional data that can be broadcasted to other components of
the application using the sendBroadcast method derivatives. Sensitive data should not
be stored in Intents, since Intents can be broadcasted outside application boundaries
if not careful. It is recommended that if an application needs to send sensitive data
between components, then the Android Binder interface be used, since the messages are
protected by the Linux kernel’s shared memory interface.
5Receiver Receivers can receive broadcasts from other applications, or from their own
application. A malicious application could use a receiver component to receive broad-
casted Intents that contain sensitive information [3].
ContentProvider The ContentProvider component is used to store data relevant
to the application, usually in a database. A ContentProvider can be shared across
applications. If the ContentProvider contains sensitive information, it should not be
exported to other applications.
Service A service runs in the background, and remains active even if the application
providing the service is not displayed on the screen. A service can be “exported” to allow
other applications to connect and use the service. By default, services are not exported
unless there is at least one intent-filter, in which case the application is exported. The
“permission” attribute can be used to limit external applications from connecting to the
service without the required permission. The payment applications studied were found
to explicitly set the “exported” option to “false” on all services.
Activities In general, Activity components are used to control the user-interface of
the application, but in some cases they can be exported and behave as a service when
the application is running. None of the payment applications were found to declare an
“exported” activity.
It is important for payment applications to correctly use the Android components
in such a way that sensitive card data is not leaked to other applications. The Android
payment applications in this thesis were analyzed for information leaks of sensitive card
data to other applications.
62.2 Payment Application Information Tracking
To understand the behavior of each application, I began with static analysis of the
smali [4] instructions to locate the entry points by which sensitive data would enter
the application. These variables were added as sources for dynamic analysis into the
TaintDroid framework.
TaintDroid [5] was designed to track data information flows from sources to sinks
within the Android system. Sources are generally Android System API methods that
an application must call in order to get access to the data. Default sources return
information such as the user’s phone number, IMEI, SIM card ID, etc. TaintDroid
tracks the data by marking or tainting the variable with a tag that identifies the entry
point or source where the data originated.
In order to track variables within an Android payment application, TaintDroid was
modified to include new source tags as listed in Table 1. Each source variable was tainted
using TaintDroid’s framework library hooks such as “addTaintString” or “addTaintInt”
depending on the data of interest. The master bitmask vector within the TaintDroid
framework was also modified to correctly identify the new tag markings. To test the
applications without an account and avoid interfering with legitimate traffic, the appli-
cations were modified to accommodate testing for each source. The applications under
investigation were reassembled and installed on our HTC Nexus One testing phone with
Android 2.3.4 r1.
When the tainted data reaches a sink, a message is sent to the Android logcat buffer.
The messages include information such as the location where the data originated and
the data that was tainted. The sinks can be seen in Table 2.
7Sources
Username
Password
Merchant ID
PAN (Primary Account Number)
Track Data
CCV/CVC code
Audio Input
Table 1: Sources
Sinks
Network
ContentValue
sendBroadcast
Parcel
File Output
Table 2: Sinks
2.3 Summary
It was discovered, that the Android payment applications analyzed had careful thought
put into protecting customers’ data from leaking to locations where other applications on
the phone could easily intercept it. Of the applications analyzed, there were no sensitive
leaks discovered that could be intercepted by other applications. There were no Intents
that contained sensitive information. The manifest files were not exporting services to
other applications, and no sensitive card data was being stored in a file. All data that
was tainted and reaching network sinks was found to be sent out of the smartphone
securely over HTTPS.
I learned that using taint tracking to track sensitive card data has its downsides.
8Without source code of an application, using TaintDroid’s taint tracking methods to
hook variables in applications requires a large amount of manual work to recreate a
testing framework. Also, the TaintDroid sink notifies all occurrences of tainted data
reaching a sink, but some of the data is masked out and becomes no longer sensitive
In this analysis, all TaintDroid messages were found to not include sensitive data
that could be intercepted by another application. Since smartphone point-of-sale units
require all of the components of the system to be secure, this thesis continues by looking
at the Audio Magnetic Stripe Readers (AMSRs).
9Chapter 3
AMSR Analysis
Audio-jack magnetic strip readers (AMSRs) fall into the area of embedded systems, and
thus combine hardware and software into a device that has limited resources like energy,
memory and processing power. I was able to obtain four different AMSRs. Each of
the AMSRs have a microcontroller that protects the firmware and the encryption key(s)
by blowing the programming fuse after the device has been programmed. However,
simply disabling the programming pipe does not protect the memory contents, as will
be discussed later.
3.1 Power
One of the AMSRs I investigated uses a non-rechargable battery for its power supply
and thus has a finite lifetime and will not be discussed further. The remaining AMSRs
fully rely on power through one of the two available output audio channels from the
smartphone. There is an output channel remaining for the smartphone to send data or
commands to the AMSR and the microphone channel is used by the AMSR to send card
data back to the phone.
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3.2 Communication
The audio input and output port for many Android phones is high-pass filtered, elim-
inating communications that could be at a constant voltage level for a long period of
time such as would be found in a UART with long runs of 1’s or 0’s. In order to still use
the UART, the bandwidth is halved because manchester encoding is used where 1’s are
replaced with 01 and 0’s are replaced with 10. By using manchester encoding, runs of
0’s or 1’s are eliminated and the UART can still be used. Resynchronization by a stop
bit is no longer possible because of alternating 1’s and 0’s. Therefore, synchronization
is done by sending a pattern of alternating 1’s and 0’s to produce a double bit pattern
manchester encoded such as: 1100.
3.3 Security
Initially, there was suspicion that the applications were masking out account numbers
or other sensitive information contained in the audio signal. It was important to verify
that what the AMSR was sending to the phone was indeed identical to the data decoded
by the application’s signal processing routines. In order to analyze the audio signals sent
from the AMSR to the phone, the received audio signal was recorded. Since the audio
data is manchester encoded, manchester decoding software was written in MATLAB to
convert the encoded swipes in the wave file back to bytes. The bytes were compared
with the decoded bytes given from the respective application. Additional protocol bytes
were found to assist the application in synchronization and parsing the data, but no
extra card data was discovered.
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Key Managment. Some of the AMSRs used a form of key management called Derived
Unique Key Per Transaction, commonly referred to as DUKPT. DUKPT generates a
new key for each transaction off of an initial key so that if a generated key is leaked,
only one encrypted transaction is compromised, and all past and future transactions are
still protected.
To perform a transaction, the cipher text is sent to the processing company along
with the device’s serial number and transaction number. The processing company must
store the loaded initial key, along with the device’s serial number in order to decrypt
transactions. For more information about DUKPT, one may consult the ANSI X9.24
part 1 [6]. Other AMSRs were using a similar key rotation mechanism, but the exact
scheme could not be determined by simply looking at the returned data or from online
documentation.
In regard to AMSR security, the initial DUKPT key is embedded in the non-volatile
memory of the microcontroller’s hardware. Therefore, it is essential to protect the key
by locking down external memory access. It is important to make sure that there are
no bugs in the firmware which can compromise the AMSR’s state or reveal customer’s
card data.
One of the AMSRs studied was found to be communicating with the smartphone
via a set of control commands. A fuzzer was built that could communicate with this
AMSR. By fuzzing with these control commands, a vulnerability was discovered which
could in theory, allow a malicious application to skim recorded track data on a Android
smartphone if the operating system has been compromised.
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Chapter 4
Improving the AMSR design
Since one of the AMSRs contained a software logic error that could potentially lead to
the loss of customer magnetic track data, one question that may be asked is that if public
key cryptography (PKC) would have been used, could card data be better protected?
The remainder of this thesis investigates the question of whether or not PKC can be im-
plemented in an AMSR with the restrictions pertaining to the AMSR environment. This
thesis compares the asymmetric Elliptic Curve Cryptography ECIES standard with the
current symmetric encryption schemes deployed in AMSRs. I evaluated Elliptic Curve
Cryptography using the ECIES implementation found in TinyECC [7] to understand if
there was software already available that could support PKC with minimal changes to
an AMSR design. TinyECC was originally created to provide PKC to wireless sensor
motes, and was written for the TinyOS [8] framework.
AMSR Challenges. Since AMSRs are limited by memory, clock frequency, and power
supply, it is important to have a balance between code size, operation latency, and power
consumption. To improve performance of firmware, hand tuning can be done, but may
have a negative impact on the firmware’s size. For example, loop unrolling can reduce
the number of instructions executed, but in order to do so, the looping routine is copied
into the binary to avoid branching. Automatic software tools such as a compiler can be
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used to improve the memory footprint of a firmware image as well as the performance.
The encryption algorithm in an AMSR must be responsive. The latency between
the time it takes a merchant to swipe a card and receive encrypted card data results is
an important metric for an AMSRs. If an AMSR takes too long to encrypt card data,
a customer or a merchant may become annoyed that he or she must wait so long for
the transaction to complete. It is well known that clock frequency and dynamic power
are closely related. A starting point for investigating PKC for AMSRs is to determine
whether or not Android smartphones can provide power through the audio-jack for a
microcontroller to operate at a clock frequency that can perform asymmetric encryption
fast enough.
4.1 Available power
An AMSR needs power to read card data, encrypt it, and send the result back to
the phone. In [9], researchers designed an audio-jack sensor adapter for the iPhone that
exclusively used audio-jack for power and communication. However, without access to an
iPhone, this thesis focuses on the audio power generated by three Android smartphones.
It is well known that power transfer is maximized when the output and load impedances
of two networks are matched. The output impedance of the audio-jack for an iPhone
will vary a small amount from iPhone to iPhone due to random manufacturer variations.
Meanwhile, Android smartphone models could have audio-jacks from completely differ-
ent manufacturers. This could cause audio-jack output impedances to differ significantly
between different Android models, and thus limit power available to the AMSR. It is,
therefore, crucial to measure a variety of Android phones and verify that sufficient power
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is available from the audio-jack.
Setup. I had access to three Android phones: Samsung Fascinate, HTC Nexus One,
and the Samsung Galaxy S2. Each came equipped with a standard 3.5mm audio-jack.
An application was created to generate a square wave at varying frequencies from 20Hz
to 24kHz and installed on each phone. As in [9], I found the AC audio power to be
independent of frequency. Setting the output frequency to 6kHz, I measured the current
and voltage while varying the test load resistance.
Figure 1: Audio power available
P = Irms ∗ Vrms
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Phone Max Power Realizable Freq Realizable Power Impedance
HTC Nexus One 12.48mW(rms) 16.8KHz 6.24mW 2.64Ω
Samsung S2 28.17mW(rms) 23.5KHz 14.08mW 3.70Ω
Samsung Fascinate 17.80mW(rms) 24KHz 8.01mW 3.87Ω
Table 3: Comparison of power available
A plot of the recorded current and voltage values are in Figure 1 as well as the power.
The maximum power transfer occurs when the output and load impedances are matched
and can be seen as the maximum value of the parabolic curve in Figure 1 for each of the
phones investigated. I found the maximum power available for an AMSR to be different
for each of the phones and inversely proportional to the phones release date. A reason
for this is because newer phones such as the Samsung Galaxy S2, are becoming more
powerful and therefore supply more current. More testing could be done with phones of
the same type to determine phone-power variance, but this does not seem necessary for
this thesis.
Once the audio signal reaches the AMSR, it needs to be converted from AC to DC,
boosted, and then filtered. Using the low voltage rectifier design from [9] that used a
mini-transformer with primary DC resistance of 200 mΩ and inductance at 25 µH, the
required output frequency for each phone’s audio jack can be calculated. However, the
low-voltage rectifier design from [9], was only able to convert 50% of the maximum power
to usable power. This is not considered an issue for this analysis, because the design is
still low-cost and well documented, it will be included in the analysis of AMSRs .
Z = jωL = j2pifL
Even though the output power of the phone’s audio jack was found to be independent
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of frequency, the impedance of the mini-transformer is dependent on frequency, and thus
influences the power available to rectify. Impedance is measured Z =
Vrms
Irms
. By measur-
ing the voltage and current for each audio jack, I calculated the vector Z of impedances
seen by the mini-transformer as resistance changes. Using f =
Z
25µH ∗ 2pi , the vector
of frequencies f and the vector of P calculated previously is plotted in Figure 2. The
black dashed line at 24KHz represents the maximum frequency that can be generated
by an Android smartphone.
The Samsung Fascinate was the only smartphone examined which was not able to
achieve maximum power transfer at 24.66KHz for the design in [9]. In Table 3, the power
supplied by the smartphones is provided. Interestingly, the HTC Nexus is only able to
generate 6.24mW of useable power, while the Samsung Galaxy S2 can generate more
than double the power at 14.08mW. The amount of power that can be generated by the
smartphone does effect the clock frequency of the microcontroller, as will be discussed
later and can be seen in Table 4.
4.2 Microcontroller selection
The TI MSP430 was selected to be evaluated because it is small, low cost, low power
and because was it used in two of the AMSRs analyzed. The TI MSP430 also has
a cycle-accurate simulator called MSPSim which was modified to obtain performance
metrics of encryption algorithm benchmarks which will be discussed later. A sample of
MSP430 microcontrollers were selected for comparison. The power consumption values,
low-power statistics, and memory available were extrapolated from the microcontrollers’
datasheets [10, 11, 12, 13]
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Figure 2: Converted power available
Having measured the audio power generated by the smartphones, it was found that
some of sampled TI MSP430 microcontrollers would not work at all clock frequencies.
In Table 4, one can see that even the HTC Nexus One, with the lowest power output,
can generate enough power to run the microcontroller at 8MHz. In fact, the HTC Nexus
One can power the FR573x at 16MHz. The two Samsung models provide enough power
to allow the microcontrollers to run at faster clock frequencies above 16MHz, and thus
perform calculations faster.
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Version Average Power Clock Frequency
FR572x/3x 0.93mW 1MHz
2.19mW 4MHz
3.90mW 8MHz
FR573x 5.25mW 16MHz
6.3mW 20MHz
7.5mW 24MHz
F21x2 0.16mW 1MHz
4.09mW 8MHz
12mW 12MHz
17.8mW 16MHz
G2x52 0.16mW 1MHz
2.5mW 8MHz
6.8mW 12MHz
13.8mW 16MHz
F551x 0.64mW 1MHz
4.17mW 8MHz
8.0mW 12MHz
13.62mW 20MHz
24.2mW 25MHz
Table 4: TI MSP430 maximum active power consumption
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Chapter 5
Motivation
To provide substance on why the encryption runtime should be reduced, an analysis is
performed on a prototype AMSR firmware. A general firmware model for an AMSR is
divided up into separate states as follows:
1. WAIT
2. PROCESS
3. VALIDATE
4. ENCRYPT
5. SEND
A description of each of the above states is given below:
WAIT In this state, the AMSR is waiting to read in card data in an idle low-power
mode. The microcontroller is awoken by a hardware interrupt signaling that card data
is available and changes into the PROCESS state.
PROCESS In the process card data state, the microcontroller reads in the card data
as fast as the card data can be processed by the microcontroller’s ADC or by the micro-
controller’s hardware-controlled serial input bus if the card data has been digitized by
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a magnetic card-processing integrated circuit. After reading of the card data has been
completed, the AMSR goes into the VALIDATE state.
VALIDATE The validate state is used to reduce the amount of power that would be
consumed by bad swipes in the encryption state. If the data is valid, then the AMSR
will go into the ENCRYPT state. If the data is not valid, the AMSR will go into the
SEND state and notify the merchant that the swipe was bad.
ENCRYPT In this state, the AMSR’s microcontroller encrypts the received card
data. The encryption scheme used here needs to provide indistinguishability between all
cipher texts by using correct key management. The key management techniques can use
DUKPT with a secure block cipher. If the microcontroller is powerful enough, a public
key cryptography encryption scheme could be used to protect the card data as will be
seen later.
SEND In this state, the card data is manchester encoded, 0s replaced with 10s and
1s replaced with 01s and sent out the microcontroller’s UART to the microphone in-
put channel of the phone. When the encrypted card data has been transferred, the
microcontroller goes back to the WAIT state to receive additional swipes.
Preliminary runtime results for the above states are included in Table 5. These are
calculated values from experiments performed on a TI MSP430FR5739 [10] running at
8MHz. The WAIT state is not included, since the time in that state is a function of
utilization and depends on factors that can not be controlled by software. The time in
the process state is for a full card swipe which was simulated as 128-bytes being sent
over a UART port running at 9600bps from a magnetic card ADC. The time for the
21
State Time
PROCESS 0.13s
VALIDATE 122us
ENCRYPT 0.243s
SEND 0.52s
Total 0.893s
Table 5: Runtime Values
validate state is given as the worst case; when validation runs to completion on a valid
swipe with a set of memory compare and increment address instructions. The time in
the encryption state depends on the encryption scheme. In this case TDEA was chosen
with a random 112-bit key, in CBC mode, and with an IV of all zeros. The time in
the send state is for sending 256-bytes of manchester encoded encrypted data over the
UART at 9600bps.
Since the encryption is done in software on a low clock frequency microcontroller,
the encryption processing takes the most time compared to other firmware routines, and
therefore consumes the most energy. The other firmware states could also be optimized,
but because their runtime is short, their impact on decreasing energy usage would not
be as significant as would shorter runtimes for encryption routines.
As discussed earlier, the AMSR’s encryption needs to be efficient and be able to
produce a result quickly without consuming more energy than necessary.
E = P ∗ t
Where E is the energy (joules) which is equivalent to power P (Watts) multiplied
by time t (seconds). To minimize energy consumption, the intrinsic power and runtime
22
can be minimized. The power consumed on the low power TI MSP430 FR5739 micro-
controller was found to be independent of the instructions executing. This is likely due
to the low power design of the microcontroller’s internal components. Thus, in order to
reduce energy consumption, the runtime of the encryption algorithm is minimized.
5.1 Encryption Scheme
The encryption scheme used in an AMSR is important. The decision on which encryp-
tion scheme is chosen will also depend on how the backend processor decrypts card
data. Typically, symmetric based key techniques are used for encryption because of low
memory requirements and fast processing time as compared to asymmetric encryption.
In the event that an AMSR’s hardware can not protect against memory reads, asym-
metric key cryptography should be implemented on the device. An advantage to using
asymmetric keys in an AMSRs as opposed to symmetric keys, is that if the public key
is obtained from the AMSR by an nefarious attacker, he or she will not be able to de-
crypt past or future encrypted transactions easily without the private key. The device’s
private key will be at the payment-authorizing financial institution and used to decrypt
incoming card data.
5.1.1 Symmetric Encryption
TDEA. Triple Data Encryption Algorithm or TDEA [14] is a block cipher, which
applies the Data Encryption Algorithm three times to each data block. TDEA uses
three DES keys: K1, K2, and K3 each 64-bits or 56-bits after parity bits are removed.
The effective key size for TDEA is 112bits or 168bits for two independent keys or for
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three independent keys respectively. The TDEA block cipher is not as fast as AES since
DES was originally designed to be efficient in hardware. In the benchmarks, TDEA is
used with two independent keys giving a bit strength of 112 bits.
AES. Advanced Encryption Standard or AES [15] is a block cipher that is based on
a substitution-permutation network. It was designed to be fast in both software and
hardware, and replace DES. The block size for AES is fixed at 128 bytes. The key size
for AES can be 128, 192, or 256 bits. Either AES or TDEA could be used as the block
cipher in a DUKPT encryption scheme. As will be discussed later, AES with 128-bit
keys was chosen for the benchmark.
5.1.2 Asymmetric Encryption
Asymmetric encryption does come with its own setbacks: Larger key size and longer
computation time. This is especially troublesome when the compute environment is
limited to compute power and memory as is the case with audio MSRs. The key size
for RSA, a popular public key encryption scheme, can range anywhere from 1024 to
15360-bits depending on the version used. The RSA key size requirement is too large for
a microcontroller with limited memory and therefore was not evaluated. Elliptic curve
cryptography keys are smaller than RSA, and can range from 160 bits to 521-bits [16].
Elliptic curve cryptography is a more popular choice for embedded systems because of
the smaller key size.
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme. Elliptic Curve Cryptography is
public-key cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite
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fields. It is assumed that finding the discrete logarithm of a random elliptic curve
element with respect to a publicly-known base point is infeasible. The size of the elliptic
curve determines the difficulty of the problem. An elliptic curve is a plane curve which
consists of the points satisfying the following equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b
along with a distinguished point at infinity. This set together with the group operation
of the elliptic group theory, form an Abelian group with the point at infinity as the
identity element.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography for AMSRs has the potential to keep encrypted cus-
tomer’s card data safe in the event that the hardware fails to protect the embedded
public key. The Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group evaluated and published
a standard on an ECC encryption scheme called Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption
Scheme ECIES [17].
The cryptographic primitives used in the SECG ECIES standard are provided below:
• KDF - ANSI-X9.63-KDF with SHA-1 option
• MAC - HMAC-SHA-1-160 with 160-bit keys
• Symmetric encryption scheme block cipher or XOR scheme
Elliptic Curve domain parameters: (p, a, b, G, n, h) are chosen for a curve over a prime
field. These parameters are the same for the the AMSR and the backend to decrypt
the messages. At an earlier time, the public key and private key have been previously
generated. Bob (the backend) generates his public key as follows: KB = kBG, where kB
is the private key that is chosen at random at some earlier point where: kB ∈ [1, n− 1])
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The private key is stored at the backend. Alice (the AMSR) can encrypt a messages.
For more detail, one may consult [17].
Encrypt. To encrypt a message m Alice or the AMSR does the following:
1. Generates a random number r ∈ [1, n− 1] and calculates R = rG
2. Derives a shared secret: S = Px where P = (Px, Py) = rKB and (P 6= O)
3. Uses the KDF to create symmetric encryption and MAC keys: kE||kM = KDF (S||S1)
4. Encrypts the message: c = E(kE,m)
5. Computes the tag of the encrypted message and S2: d = MAC(kM , c||S2)
6. Outputs R||c||d
In summary, the encryption routine for ECIES performs wide operand multiplications
before the data is actually encrypted. Since multiplication operations in microcontrollers
are multi-cycle operations, multiplication is overhead is significant in ECIES. The en-
cryption routine E, specified by ECIES, can be a block cipher or an XOR one-time pad
with the key kE. The decryption routine at the backend is similar but can be executed
quicker because high performance hardware is available.
Decrypt. To decrypt the cipher text R||c||d Bob (the backend) does the following:
1. Derives the shared secret: S = Px, where P = (Px, Py) = kBR this is identical to
the shared secret derived by the AMSR because P = kBR = kBrG = rkBG = rKB)
2. Uses the KDF with the shared secret to derive the encryption and MAC keys:
kE||kM = KDF (S||S1)
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3. Uses MAC to check if the tag and outputs failed or: d 6= MAC(kM , c||S2)
4. Uses symmetric encryption scheme to decrypt the message m = E−1(kE, c)
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Chapter 6
Benchmark
6.1 Benchmark Setup
Compiler optimizations for mspgcc were varied to compare performance in the AES,
TDEA and ECIES algorithm benchmarks. To evaluate performance of the three en-
cryption algorithms: AES, TDES, and ECIES the simulator MSPSim [18] was used to
obtain cycle-accurate timings and memory usage for the each algorithm. To verify that
the results were valid, additional firmware was written to send the result out through
the simulated serial interface. The open-source TI versions of AES and DES [19, 20]
were downloaded and modified to work in MSPSim. The ECC benchmark consists of
a modified version of TinyECC [7] with only the necessary ECIES encryption routines.
The key is preinitialized inside the firmware for each benchmark. Each benchmark en-
crypts the same randomly-generated 128-byte data block and the number of cycles are
recorded as well as the maximum RAM usage. The ROM memory consumption is ob-
tained by using the mspgcc readelf tool on the binary. To keep the comparison fair,
the ECIES encryption routine encrypts 128-bytes of data using the XOR mode of the
ECIES scheme instead of a block cipher such as AES or TDEA.
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Encryption Algorithm Key Size Mode
TDEA 112-bit CBC
AES 128-bit CBC
ECIES 160-bit XOR
Table 6: Encryption Algorithm Options
Version SRAM Flash FRAM
FR5739 1024B NA 16KB
F2132 512B 8KB NA
G2452 256B 8KB NA
F5513 4096B 32KB NA
Table 7: Microcontroller Memory Comparison
6.2 Results
Memory. As expected, the ECIES algorithm, which can be seen in Figure 3, occupies
the most memory because of the additional OS overhead from TinyOS. With compiler
optimization the ECIES ROM size increases gradually to nearly 18K which is more than
many TI MSPs have available in Table 7. The only microcontroller from Table 7 that
meets the memory requirements of ECIES is the F5513.
The ROM memory consumption by TDEA is significantly larger than AES because
TDEA requires both encryption and decryption routines to compute a single cipher text.
The RAM consumption by AES is lower than TDEA when optimizations are off, but
when optimizations are turned on the RAM consumption by AES is around a hundred
bytes larger. Even though AES and TDEA use less memory, the benefits from using
ECIES outweigh the memory overhead, as will be discussed later.
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Figure 3: ROM and RAM consumption by ECIES, TDEA and AES
Speed. It was expected and verified that ECIES takes the most time to complete a
single encryption routine because of the multiplication operations. The time for TDEA
to encrypt the data is substantially larger than AES, as seen in Figure 4. With compiler
optimization O1, AES and TDEA encryption algorithms reduce cycle time substantially.
Meanwhile, ECIES does not seem to gain much improvement with compiler optimiza-
tions. This may be from the fact that ECIES includes handwritten assembly routines
for the long multiplication routines that prevent additional compiler optimizations. The
additional benefit of the next compiler optimization O2 is not as significant as is no
compiler optimizations is some compiler optimizations. The trade off with the compiler
optimizations is an increase in memory usage as can be seen in Figure 3.
The runtime of ECIES can be reduced by increasing the microcontroller’s clock
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frequency. In Table 4, the maximum clock frequency for the F5513 which can sup-
port the memory requirements of ECIES is 25MHz. However, in order to run at that
25MHz, 24.2mW is required and the maximum power generated by Samsung Galaxy S2
is 14.08mW. This limits the device to 20MHz at 13.08mW with efficiency at 0.65mW/Hz.
Re-running the benchmark for ECIES at 20MHz, the average response time was recorded
at 1.6s which is still an improvement over 8MHz of nearly 4s. A response time of 1.6s is
satisfactory for PKC that is encrypting card data.
6.3 Discussion.
Even though, in simulation, ECIES could take 1.6s to perform encryption at 20MHz,
there are several benefits gained from using ECIES as opposed to the symmetric based
key management with DUKPT. First, the cipher texts provide integrity checking such
that the processor can verify the origin of the message as authentic before decrypting it.
Secondly, if the public key is stolen from the AMSR, the encrypted track data cannot be
easily decrypted without the private key. Lastly, ECIES public keys are only 160-bits in
length and do not consume much more memory than its symmetric cohorts.
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Figure 4: Performance comparison TDEA, AES, and ECIES running at 8MHz
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis studied the flow of sensitive data within Android payment applications, as
well as the security of audio magnetic card readers (AMSRs) available for the payment
applications. The results for payment applications showed that the Android payment
applications are not sending customer information to locations where other applications
may easily intercept it. However, if the phone’s operating system is compromised, there
is no secure hardware mechanism like a trusted platform module to protect and secure
card data that is not encrypted.
The AMSR analysis located software issues with one AMSR. A further analysis was
performed with simulation to verify whether, by using currently available software and
hardware, a designer could improve the security of customer’s card data with public key
encryption while being limited to audio power and the memory resources of a microcon-
troller.
From the phones examined, the most recently-released phone, the Samsung Galaxy
S2, was able to supply enough power using the rectifier design from [9], to in theory
power the F5513 [12] microcontroller and perform ECIES in under 1.6s. The other
phones examined were not able to achieve such performance. It is likely that newer
phones, like the Samsung Galaxy S2 and those that follow, will continue to provide
sufficient audio-jack power to efficiently run ECIES and protect customer card data.
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In the future, research could pursue implementing and testing a full AMSR firmware
to use the ECIES algorithm on the F5513 or similar microcontroller. However, precau-
tions should be taken to avoid possible side-channels in poor implementations.
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